Ft Leavenworth Series Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Soviet Theory, and Operational Warfare

After WWII, many historians, as well as military theorists and leaders, focused on the German ability to restore mobility to warfare, especially at the operational level, in the early years of the war. Popularized as “Blitzkrieg,” the Germans were often portrayed as the pioneers of this new form of warfare—far ahead of all other nations in 1939-40. However, this view overlooks the tremendously far-sighted Operational doctrine of the Soviet Union that had reached a high degree of development. Building on some earlier Tsarist era examples (Suvorov, Brusilov), a crop of Soviet military leaders emerged from their own Civil with fresh ideas for the future of warfare. Along with other prescient theorists (for example, Frunze, Svechin, Triandifillov, and Isserson), Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky developed a doctrine of the operational art that reached a high-point with the publication of the Red Army’s Provisional Field Regulations of 1936. The regulations posited a doctrine of deep battle far ahead of German doc